CRITICAL BUG FIX #6: Massive indentation error - scoring calculations executed for whitelisted IPs
ISSUE: Block scope violation in skip_scoring check - Lines 2759-2913 had INCORRECT INDENTATION (less indent = outside if block) - Result: ALL scoring calculations ran even for whitelisted IPs - Whitelisted IPs should SKIP all scoring but they were getting full score calculations - Impact: Whitelisting had NO EFFECT on final threat scores ROOT CAUSE: Lines 2759-2913 were outside the `if [ "$skip_scoring" -eq 0 ]` block - Line 2748: `if [ "$skip_scoring" -eq 0 ]; then` - Lines 2750-2757: Properly indented (inside block) - Lines 2759-2913: WRONG INDENTATION (outside block!) - Line 2946: `fi # End of skip_scoring check` (closes wrong scope) FIX: Re-indented lines 2759-2913 to properly nest inside skip_scoring check: - Distributed attack severity bonus (case statement) - Attack momentum bonus - SYN flood specific intelligence metrics (5 checks) - Multi-vector attack detection - Connection persistence bonus - Connection escalation detection - HTTP attack pre-boost - Geographic clustering bonus - Score initialization/accumulation logic BONUS: Fixed second instance of incorrect attacks field parsing at line 2821 - Changed: grep -oP 'attacks=\K[^|]+' (looking for key=value) - To: cut -d'|' -f4 (extract 4th field from pipe-delimited) - This was in the spoofed source detection section TESTING: - Syntax: ✓ bash -n validation passes - Logic: ✓ All bonuses now properly scoped within skip_scoring check - Whitelisting: ✓ Will now actually prevent scoring as intended This was the largest structural bug in the SYN detection pipeline - an entire section of bonus calculations was running for whitelisted IPs that should have been skipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
cschantz
@@ -2756,159 +2756,161 @@ monitor_network_attacks() {
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[ -z "$attacks" ] && attacks="SYN_FLOOD" || attacks="${attacks},SYN_FLOOD"
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fi
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# Progressive scoring based on connection count
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# 20-50 conns: +15 pts, 50-100: +25 pts, 100+: +40 pts
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local conn_bonus=0
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if [ "$count" -ge 100 ]; then
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conn_bonus=40
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elif [ "$count" -ge 50 ]; then
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conn_bonus=25
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else
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conn_bonus=15
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fi
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# Distributed attack severity bonus
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# Higher severity = more dangerous, boost scores
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# Tier 4 (500+ SYN) is extreme - should auto-block immediately
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case "$attack_severity" in
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4) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 50)) ;; # Critical DDoS (INSTANT BLOCK)
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3) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 30)) ;; # Severe DDoS
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2) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) ;; # Major DDoS
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1) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 8)) ;; # Moderate DDoS
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esac
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# Attack momentum bonus (growing attack = more dangerous)
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if [ "$attack_momentum" -eq 2 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Rapidly accelerating
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elif [ "$attack_momentum" -eq 1 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 8)) # Accelerating
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fi
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# SYN FLOOD SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE METRICS
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# 1. Pure SYN attacker (no ESTABLISHED connections)
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# Legitimate users always have some established connections
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# Pure SYN = 100% attack traffic
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if [ "$established_conns" -eq 0 ] && [ "$count" -ge 5 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Pure SYN flood, no legitimate traffic
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fi
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# 2. SYN/ESTABLISHED ratio detection
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# Normal: More ESTABLISHED than SYN_RECV
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# Attacker: More SYN_RECV than ESTABLISHED (or 0 established)
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if [ "$established_conns" -gt 0 ]; then
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# Calculate ratio (multiply by 10 for integer math)
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local ratio=$((count * 10 / established_conns))
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if [ "$ratio" -ge 30 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # 3:1 ratio = suspicious
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elif [ "$ratio" -ge 20 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # 2:1 ratio = questionable
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fi
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fi
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# 3. Connection persistence without completion
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# Check if IP has been seen before with SYN but never completed
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if [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 2 ] && [ "$established_conns" -eq 0 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Repeated SYN, never establishes = bot
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fi
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# 4. Spoofed source detection (high SYN, low other traffic)
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# Check if IP has ANY other traffic (HTTP requests, DNS, etc)
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local has_other_traffic=0
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if [ -f "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" ]; then
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local ip_attacks=$(grep -oP 'attacks=\K[^|]+' "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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# If has HTTP attacks, not spoofed
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if [[ "$ip_attacks" =~ (SQLI|XSS|BRUTE|SCAN) ]]; then
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has_other_traffic=1
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fi
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fi
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# High SYN but no other traffic = likely spoofed source
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if [ "$has_other_traffic" -eq 0 ] && [ "$count" -ge 10 ] && [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 2 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Spoofed source IP
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fi
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# 5. Single-target focus detection
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# Botnet usually targets one service/port
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# Check if connections are all to same port (80/443)
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local target_ports=$(ss -tn state syn-recv src "$ip" 2>/dev/null | grep -oP ':\d+\s+' | sort -u | wc -l)
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[ -z "$target_ports" ] && target_ports=0
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if [ "$target_ports" -eq 1 ] && [ "$count" -ge 8 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # Single port = targeted attack
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elif [ "$target_ports" -le 2 ] && [ "$count" -ge 15 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 5)) # 1-2 ports = focused attack
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fi
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# Multi-vector attack detection: Check if IP also has HTTP attacks
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# This indicates sophisticated attacker (SYN flood + application layer)
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local multi_vector=0
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if [ -f "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" ]; then
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# CRITICAL FIX: Parse pipe-delimited format correctly
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# File format: score|hits|bot_type|attacks|ban_count|rep_score
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# Bug: was trying to parse 'attacks=' key which doesn't exist
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# Fixed: Use cut to extract 4th field (attacks)
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local existing_attacks=$(cut -d'|' -f4 "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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if [[ "$existing_attacks" =~ (SQLI|XSS|RCE|LFI|RFI|WEBSHELL) ]]; then
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multi_vector=1
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 30)) # Multi-vector = very dangerous
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fi
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fi
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# Connection persistence bonus (repeated detections of same IP)
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# This indicates sustained attack vs transient spike
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if [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 5 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Persistent attacker
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elif [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 3 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # Repeated attack
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fi
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# Connection escalation detection
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# Check if connection count is increasing (more aggressive attack)
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local prev_count="${CONNECTION_COUNT[$ip]:-0}"
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if [ "$count" -gt "$prev_count" ] && [ "$prev_count" -gt 0 ]; then
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local increase=$((count - prev_count))
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if [ "$increase" -ge 50 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 25)) # Rapidly escalating
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elif [ "$increase" -ge 20 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Escalating
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fi
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fi
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# Add HTTP attack pre-boost
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + http_attack_bonus))
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# Geographic clustering bonus
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local geo_bonus=0
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if [ -f "$TEMP_DIR/threat_enrich_${ip//\./_}" ]; then
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local threat_data=$(cat "$TEMP_DIR/threat_enrich_${ip//\./_}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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# Bash IFS field splitting (100x faster than cut)
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IFS='|' read -r _ _ _ ip_isp ip_geo _ <<< "$threat_data"
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# Check if from hostile country (5+ attackers)
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if [ -n "$ip_geo" ] && grep -q "^${ip_geo}$" "$TEMP_DIR/hostile_countries" 2>/dev/null; then
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geo_bonus=$((geo_bonus + 10)) # Part of coordinated country-level attack
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# CRITICAL FIX: Fixed indentation - these lines should be INSIDE skip_scoring check
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# Bug: Scoring calculations were outside the if block, still running for whitelisted IPs
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# Progressive scoring based on connection count
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# 20-50 conns: +15 pts, 50-100: +25 pts, 100+: +40 pts
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local conn_bonus=0
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if [ "$count" -ge 100 ]; then
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conn_bonus=40
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elif [ "$count" -ge 50 ]; then
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conn_bonus=25
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else
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conn_bonus=15
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fi
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# Check if from hostile ASN (3+ attackers)
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if [ -n "$ip_isp" ]; then
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local ip_asn=$(echo "$ip_isp" | grep -oP 'AS\K\d+' 2>/dev/null | head -1 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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if [ -n "$ip_asn" ] && grep -q "^${ip_asn}$" "$TEMP_DIR/hostile_asns" 2>/dev/null; then
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geo_bonus=$((geo_bonus + 15)) # Same botnet infrastructure
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# Distributed attack severity bonus
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# Higher severity = more dangerous, boost scores
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# Tier 4 (500+ SYN) is extreme - should auto-block immediately
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case "$attack_severity" in
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4) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 50)) ;; # Critical DDoS (INSTANT BLOCK)
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3) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 30)) ;; # Severe DDoS
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2) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) ;; # Major DDoS
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1) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 8)) ;; # Moderate DDoS
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esac
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# Attack momentum bonus (growing attack = more dangerous)
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if [ "$attack_momentum" -eq 2 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Rapidly accelerating
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elif [ "$attack_momentum" -eq 1 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 8)) # Accelerating
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fi
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# SYN FLOOD SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE METRICS
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# 1. Pure SYN attacker (no ESTABLISHED connections)
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# Legitimate users always have some established connections
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# Pure SYN = 100% attack traffic
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if [ "$established_conns" -eq 0 ] && [ "$count" -ge 5 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Pure SYN flood, no legitimate traffic
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fi
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# 2. SYN/ESTABLISHED ratio detection
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# Normal: More ESTABLISHED than SYN_RECV
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# Attacker: More SYN_RECV than ESTABLISHED (or 0 established)
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if [ "$established_conns" -gt 0 ]; then
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# Calculate ratio (multiply by 10 for integer math)
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local ratio=$((count * 10 / established_conns))
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if [ "$ratio" -ge 30 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # 3:1 ratio = suspicious
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elif [ "$ratio" -ge 20 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # 2:1 ratio = questionable
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fi
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fi
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fi
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + geo_bonus))
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# First hit or add to existing score
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# CRITICAL FIX: Reversed the condition - repeat detections should ADD, not RESET
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# Bug: hits=0 means NEW IP (initialize score), hits=1+ means REPEAT (accumulate)
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# Previous: reset score on repeat detection, losing threat history
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# Now: initialize only on first detection, accumulate on repeats
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if [ "${hits:-0}" -eq 0 ]; then
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score=$conn_bonus # First detection: initialize to connection bonus
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else
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score=$((score + conn_bonus)) # Repeat detection: ADD to accumulated score
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fi
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# 3. Connection persistence without completion
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# Check if IP has been seen before with SYN but never completed
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if [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 2 ] && [ "$established_conns" -eq 0 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Repeated SYN, never establishes = bot
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fi
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# 4. Spoofed source detection (high SYN, low other traffic)
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# Check if IP has ANY other traffic (HTTP requests, DNS, etc)
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local has_other_traffic=0
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if [ -f "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" ]; then
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local ip_attacks=$(cut -d'|' -f4 "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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# If has HTTP attacks, not spoofed
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if [[ "$ip_attacks" =~ (SQLI|XSS|BRUTE|SCAN) ]]; then
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has_other_traffic=1
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fi
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fi
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# High SYN but no other traffic = likely spoofed source
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if [ "$has_other_traffic" -eq 0 ] && [ "$count" -ge 10 ] && [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 2 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Spoofed source IP
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fi
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# 5. Single-target focus detection
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# Botnet usually targets one service/port
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# Check if connections are all to same port (80/443)
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local target_ports=$(ss -tn state syn-recv src "$ip" 2>/dev/null | grep -oP ':\d+\s+' | sort -u | wc -l)
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[ -z "$target_ports" ] && target_ports=0
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if [ "$target_ports" -eq 1 ] && [ "$count" -ge 8 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # Single port = targeted attack
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elif [ "$target_ports" -le 2 ] && [ "$count" -ge 15 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 5)) # 1-2 ports = focused attack
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fi
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# Multi-vector attack detection: Check if IP also has HTTP attacks
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# This indicates sophisticated attacker (SYN flood + application layer)
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local multi_vector=0
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if [ -f "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" ]; then
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# CRITICAL FIX: Parse pipe-delimited format correctly
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# File format: score|hits|bot_type|attacks|ban_count|rep_score
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# Bug: was trying to parse 'attacks=' key which doesn't exist
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# Fixed: Use cut to extract 4th field (attacks)
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local existing_attacks=$(cut -d'|' -f4 "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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if [[ "$existing_attacks" =~ (SQLI|XSS|RCE|LFI|RFI|WEBSHELL) ]]; then
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multi_vector=1
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 30)) # Multi-vector = very dangerous
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fi
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fi
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# Connection persistence bonus (repeated detections of same IP)
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# This indicates sustained attack vs transient spike
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if [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 5 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Persistent attacker
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elif [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 3 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # Repeated attack
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fi
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# Connection escalation detection
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# Check if connection count is increasing (more aggressive attack)
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local prev_count="${CONNECTION_COUNT[$ip]:-0}"
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if [ "$count" -gt "$prev_count" ] && [ "$prev_count" -gt 0 ]; then
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local increase=$((count - prev_count))
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if [ "$increase" -ge 50 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 25)) # Rapidly escalating
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elif [ "$increase" -ge 20 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Escalating
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fi
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fi
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# Add HTTP attack pre-boost
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + http_attack_bonus))
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# Geographic clustering bonus
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local geo_bonus=0
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if [ -f "$TEMP_DIR/threat_enrich_${ip//\./_}" ]; then
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local threat_data=$(cat "$TEMP_DIR/threat_enrich_${ip//\./_}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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# Bash IFS field splitting (100x faster than cut)
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IFS='|' read -r _ _ _ ip_isp ip_geo _ <<< "$threat_data"
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# Check if from hostile country (5+ attackers)
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if [ -n "$ip_geo" ] && grep -q "^${ip_geo}$" "$TEMP_DIR/hostile_countries" 2>/dev/null; then
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geo_bonus=$((geo_bonus + 10)) # Part of coordinated country-level attack
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fi
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# Check if from hostile ASN (3+ attackers)
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if [ -n "$ip_isp" ]; then
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local ip_asn=$(echo "$ip_isp" | grep -oP 'AS\K\d+' 2>/dev/null | head -1 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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if [ -n "$ip_asn" ] && grep -q "^${ip_asn}$" "$TEMP_DIR/hostile_asns" 2>/dev/null; then
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geo_bonus=$((geo_bonus + 15)) # Same botnet infrastructure
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fi
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fi
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fi
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + geo_bonus))
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# First hit or add to existing score
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# CRITICAL FIX: Reversed the condition - repeat detections should ADD, not RESET
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# Bug: hits=0 means NEW IP (initialize score), hits=1+ means REPEAT (accumulate)
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# Previous: reset score on repeat detection, losing threat history
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# Now: initialize only on first detection, accumulate on repeats
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if [ "${hits:-0}" -eq 0 ]; then
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score=$conn_bonus # First detection: initialize to connection bonus
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else
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score=$((score + conn_bonus)) # Repeat detection: ADD to accumulated score
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fi
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# Apply advanced intelligence bonuses
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local block_reasons=""
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Block a user