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3407580422
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 cschantz
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3407580422 | ||
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cschantz
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0b082aa797 | ||
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cschantz
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e7cef6a61e | ||
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cschantz
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8a154753bd | ||
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cschantz
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3b17a60100 | ||
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cschantz
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073890f062 | ||
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cschantz
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0206237449 | ||
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cschantz
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bec70c35bb | ||
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cschantz
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c4bdf9e73f | ||
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cschantz
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c24476c749 | ||
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cschantz
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9e58d160a4 | ||
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cschantz
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ef9f5f2377 | ||
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cschantz
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07448e1136 | ||
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cschantz
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8f61919361 | ||
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cschantz
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26d9559676 | ||
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cschantz
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abf0a7b943 | ||
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cschantz
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ca2d23a456 | ||
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cschantz
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cschantz
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4ea982b119 | ||
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cschantz
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244fd35e97 | ||
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cschantz
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4a9b449d60 | ||
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cschantz
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3946a84e58 | ||
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cschantz
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cschantz
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492e0884bb |
@@ -328,7 +328,19 @@ write_ip_data_to_file() {
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cp "$TEMP_DIR/ip_data" "$temp_file" 2>/dev/null || touch "$temp_file"
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# Remove old entry for this IP (if exists)
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grep -v "^${ip}=" "$temp_file" > "${temp_file}.new" 2>/dev/null || true
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# CRITICAL FIX: Check if grep succeeds before relying on output
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# Bug: If grep fails (file error), ${temp_file}.new is not created
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# Result: echo appends to non-existent file, losing all previous IPs!
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# Fix: Create new file first, then filter, then verify success
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if grep -v "^${ip}=" "$temp_file" > "${temp_file}.new" 2>/dev/null; then
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# grep succeeded - ${temp_file}.new contains all IPs except the old one
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:
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else
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# grep failed - copy all data to new file and manually remove the old entry
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cp "$temp_file" "${temp_file}.new" 2>/dev/null || touch "${temp_file}.new"
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# Try to remove old entry with sed as fallback
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sed -i "/^${ip}=/d" "${temp_file}.new" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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# Add new entry
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echo "${ip}=${data}" >> "${temp_file}.new"
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@@ -1790,7 +1802,15 @@ apply_synflood_fix() {
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echo "Enabling SYNFLOOD protection..."
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# Backup config
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cp /etc/csf/csf.conf /etc/csf/csf.conf.bak.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)
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# CRITICAL FIX: Check if backup succeeds before modifying
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# Bug: If cp fails (no write permission), script continues anyway
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# Result: Original file modified without backup - data loss if something goes wrong
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local backup_file="/etc/csf/csf.conf.bak.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)"
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if ! cp /etc/csf/csf.conf "$backup_file" 2>/dev/null; then
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echo "ERROR: Failed to backup /etc/csf/csf.conf to $backup_file"
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echo "Aborting SYNFLOOD configuration to prevent data loss"
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return 1
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fi
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# Enable SYNFLOOD
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sed -i 's/^SYNFLOOD\s*=.*/SYNFLOOD = "1"/' /etc/csf/csf.conf
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@@ -1838,7 +1858,15 @@ apply_ssh_hardening() {
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echo "Lowering threshold to 3 failed attempts..."
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# Backup config
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cp /etc/csf/csf.conf /etc/csf/csf.conf.bak.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)
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# CRITICAL FIX: Check if backup succeeds before modifying
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# Bug: If cp fails (no write permission), script continues anyway
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# Result: Original file modified without backup - data loss if something goes wrong
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local backup_file="/etc/csf/csf.conf.bak.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)"
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if ! cp /etc/csf/csf.conf "$backup_file" 2>/dev/null; then
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echo "ERROR: Failed to backup /etc/csf/csf.conf to $backup_file"
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echo "Aborting SSH hardening configuration to prevent data loss"
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return 1
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fi
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# Update LF_SSHD
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sed -i 's/^LF_SSHD\s*=.*/LF_SSHD = "3"/' /etc/csf/csf.conf
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@@ -2488,18 +2516,25 @@ monitor_network_attacks() {
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fi
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# Get total SYN_RECV count from cache
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local total_syn=$(echo "$ss_cache" | wc -l)
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# CRITICAL FIX: Subtract 1 to exclude header line "Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port"
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# Bug: wc -l was counting header + data lines, causing false severity = 0 when connections < 75
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# Result: 40 real connections + header = 41 lines, 41 < 75, so severity stays 0, threshold stays 20
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# Fix: Skip the first line (header) to get accurate connection count
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local total_syn=$(($(echo "$ss_cache" | wc -l) - 1))
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[ "$total_syn" -lt 0 ] && total_syn=0 # Handle case where ss_cache is empty/only header
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local attack_severity=0
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local unique_ips=0
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# Multi-tier distributed DDoS detection with adaptive learning
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if [ "$total_syn" -gt 500 ]; then
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# CRITICAL FIX: Use >= not > to include boundary values
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# Bug: total_syn=500 was severity 0 instead of 4 (off-by-one)
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if [ "$total_syn" -ge 500 ]; then
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attack_severity=4 # Critical DDoS (new tier)
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elif [ "$total_syn" -gt 300 ]; then
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elif [ "$total_syn" -ge 300 ]; then
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attack_severity=3 # Severe DDoS
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elif [ "$total_syn" -gt 150 ]; then
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elif [ "$total_syn" -ge 150 ]; then
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attack_severity=2 # Major DDoS
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elif [ "$total_syn" -gt 75 ]; then
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elif [ "$total_syn" -ge 75 ]; then
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attack_severity=1 # Moderate DDoS
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fi
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ATTACK_SEVERITY=$attack_severity # Store for next iteration
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@@ -2578,16 +2613,32 @@ monitor_network_attacks() {
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continue
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fi
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# Track connection count for this IP
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CONNECTION_COUNT[$ip]=$count
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# CRITICAL FIX: Don't update CONNECTION_COUNT here yet
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# Bug: Previously updated array BEFORE using it for escalation detection
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# Result: prev_count would equal current count (both just set), escalation detection always false
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# Fix: Read previous value first (line 2876), then update after scoring (line 2886+)
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# Save old value before updating - needed for escalation detection
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local prev_count="${CONNECTION_COUNT[$ip]:-0}"
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# Load IP's persistent data FIRST (before threshold calculation)
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# This gets the current lifetime hits count from ip_data
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local current_data="0|0|human||0|0"
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if [ -f "$TEMP_DIR/ip_data" ]; then
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current_data=$(grep "^${ip}=" "$TEMP_DIR/ip_data" 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2 || echo "0|0|human||0|0")
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fi
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IFS='|' read -r score hits bot_type attacks ban_count rep_score <<< "$current_data"
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# Dynamic threshold based on attack severity + momentum:
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# Tier 0: >20 connections (normal, focused attack)
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# CRITICAL FIX: Changed Tier 0 threshold from 20 to 3
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# Bug: Tier 0 (< 75 total SYN) had threshold=20, preventing detection of distributed attacks
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# With 8-41 total connections spread across IPs, no single IP reaches 20, so ZERO detection
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# Fix: Lower Tier 0 to 3 to detect any suspicious SYN activity
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# Tier 0: >3 connections (low-level activity, may be distributed)
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# Tier 1: >10 connections (75-150 total, moderate DDoS)
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# Tier 2: >6 connections (150-300 total, major DDoS)
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# Tier 3: >4 connections (300-500 total, severe DDoS)
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# Tier 4: >3 connections (500+ total, CRITICAL DDoS)
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local threshold=20
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local threshold=3
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case "$attack_severity" in
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4) threshold=3 ;; # Critical: Very aggressive (safe for production)
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3) threshold=4 ;; # Severe: Aggressive
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@@ -2610,99 +2661,113 @@ monitor_network_attacks() {
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# Minimum threshold of 3 to prevent false positives on busy web servers
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[ "$threshold" -lt 3 ] && threshold=3
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# CRITICAL FIX: Adaptive threshold based on LIFETIME detection history
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# Use persistent hits from ip_data (central database) - survives monitor restarts
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# An IP that attacks 5-10 times over days should be detected at lower threshold
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# This catches distributed/low-level probes that space out attempts over time
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# NOTE: hits variable now loaded from persistent ip_data storage
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local lifetime_hits="${hits:-0}"
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if [ "$lifetime_hits" -ge 10 ]; then
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threshold=1 # Seen 10+ times across ALL TIME: auto-block even 1 connection
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[ "$threshold" -lt 1 ] && threshold=1
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elif [ "$lifetime_hits" -ge 5 ]; then
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threshold=$((threshold - 2)) # 5-9 times: lower threshold by 2 (from 3 to 1)
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[ "$threshold" -lt 1 ] && threshold=1
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elif [ "$lifetime_hits" -ge 3 ]; then
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threshold=$((threshold - 1)) # 3-4 times: lower threshold by 1
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[ "$threshold" -lt 2 ] && threshold=2
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elif [ "$lifetime_hits" -ge 2 ]; then
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threshold=$((threshold - 1)) # 2 times: lower threshold slightly
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[ "$threshold" -lt 2 ] && threshold=2
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fi
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if [ "$count" -gt "$threshold" ]; then
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# Only process once per detection window
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if [ -z "${ALERT_SENT[$ip]}" ]; then
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ALERT_SENT[$ip]=1
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# Update IP reputation via file (subshell can't access IP_DATA array)
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# Define ip_file for this IP's individual tracking file
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local ip_file="$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}"
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local current_data="0|0|human||0|0"
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if [ -f "$ip_file" ]; then
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current_data=$(cat "$ip_file")
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fi
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IFS='|' read -r score hits bot_type attacks ban_count rep_score <<< "$current_data"
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# Increment hits
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hits=$((hits + 1))
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# Smart whitelisting: Skip IPs with MANY successful established connections
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# Smart whitelisting: Skip SCORING for IPs with MANY successful established connections
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# But still track them - don't skip the write!
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# Only whitelist if IP has 20+ established connections (highly unlikely for attacker)
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# CRITICAL FIX: Use -w flag to match whole word (prevent partial IP matches)
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# Example: "1.1.1.1" should not match "11.1.1.1" or "119.1.1.1"
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local established_conns=$(ss -tn state established 2>/dev/null | grep -w "$ip" | wc -l)
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[ -z "$established_conns" ] && established_conns=0
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local skip_scoring=0
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if [ "$established_conns" -ge 20 ]; then
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# IP has 20+ established connections = highly likely legitimate user
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continue
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# Skip scoring but STILL write/track (for historical hits)
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skip_scoring=1
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fi
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# Check if whitelisted service
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# CRITICAL FIX: Changed hits check from -eq 1 to -eq 0
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# Bug: hits=0 means NEW IP (first detection), hits=1 means repeat detection
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# Whitelist should only be checked on FIRST detection (hits=0), not repeat
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# Previous: only checked on 2nd+ detection, causing false alerts on initial detection
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if [ "$skip_scoring" -eq 0 ] && [ "${hits:-0}" -eq 0 ]; then
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# Only check whitelist on first detection, and only if not already skipped
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if is_whitelisted_service "$ip" 2>/dev/null; then
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skip_scoring=1 # Skip scoring but STILL write/track
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fi
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fi
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# Enhanced threat intelligence on first detection
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if [ "${hits:-0}" -eq 1 ]; then
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# Check if whitelisted service first
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if is_whitelisted_service "$ip" 2>/dev/null; then
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continue # Skip whitelisted IPs
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fi
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# CRITICAL FIX: Changed hits check from -eq 1 to -eq 0
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# Only query threat intelligence on FIRST detection to avoid redundant API calls
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# CRITICAL FIX #2: Moved reputation bonus calculation OUT of background subshell
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# Bug: Bonuses were calculated in background and written to $ip_file, but never added to final score
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# Fix: Calculate bonuses synchronously and add directly to $score variable
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local threat_intel_bonus=0
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if [ "$skip_scoring" -eq 0 ] && [ "${hits:-0}" -eq 0 ]; then
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# Get threat intelligence in background to avoid slowdown
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local threat_intel=$(get_threat_intelligence "$ip" 2>/dev/null)
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IFS='|' read -r abuse_conf abuse_rpts country isp geo timing whitelisted <<< "$threat_intel"
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# Store enrichment for later use
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echo "$threat_intel" > "$TEMP_DIR/threat_enrich_${ip//\./_}"
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# Geographic clustering detection (still in background to avoid blocking)
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(
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local threat_intel=$(get_threat_intelligence "$ip" 2>/dev/null)
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IFS='|' read -r abuse_conf abuse_rpts country isp geo timing whitelisted <<< "$threat_intel"
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# Store enrichment for later use
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echo "$threat_intel" > "$TEMP_DIR/threat_enrich_${ip//\./_}"
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# Geographic clustering detection
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# Check country/ASN clustering
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if [ -n "$geo" ] && [ "$geo" != "XX" ]; then
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echo "$geo" >> "$TEMP_DIR/attack_countries"
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# Check if this country has 5+ attacking IPs
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local country_count=$(grep -c "^${geo}$" "$TEMP_DIR/attack_countries" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
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if [ "$country_count" -ge 5 ]; then
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# Coordinated attack from same country - boost all IPs from there
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echo "$geo" >> "$TEMP_DIR/hostile_countries"
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fi
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fi
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# ASN clustering detection
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if [ -n "$isp" ]; then
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# Extract ASN number from ISP string
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local asn=$(echo "$isp" | grep -oP 'AS\K\d+' 2>/dev/null | head -1 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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if [ -n "$asn" ]; then
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echo "$asn" >> "$TEMP_DIR/attack_asns"
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local asn_count=$(grep -c "^${asn}$" "$TEMP_DIR/attack_asns" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
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if [ "$asn_count" -ge 3 ]; then
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# Same ASN/hosting provider used by 3+ attackers
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echo "$asn" >> "$TEMP_DIR/hostile_asns"
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fi
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fi
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fi
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# Apply reputation boosts based on AbuseIPDB
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if [ "${abuse_conf:-0}" -ge 75 ]; then
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# High confidence malicious - add 30 points
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local curr_data=$(cat "$ip_file" 2>/dev/null || echo "0|0|human||0|0")
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IFS='|' read -r old_score old_hits old_bot old_attacks old_ban old_rep <<< "$curr_data"
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local new_score=$((old_score + 30))
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[ "$new_score" -gt 100 ] && new_score=100
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echo "$new_score|$old_hits|$old_bot|$old_attacks|$old_ban|$old_rep" > "$ip_file"
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elif [ "${abuse_conf:-0}" -ge 50 ]; then
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# Medium confidence - add 15 points
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local curr_data=$(cat "$ip_file" 2>/dev/null || echo "0|0|human||0|0")
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IFS='|' read -r old_score old_hits old_bot old_attacks old_ban old_rep <<< "$curr_data"
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local new_score=$((old_score + 15))
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[ "$new_score" -gt 100 ] && new_score=100
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echo "$new_score|$old_hits|$old_bot|$old_attacks|$old_ban|$old_rep" > "$ip_file"
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fi
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# High-risk country adds 5 points
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if is_high_risk_country "${geo:-XX}" 2>/dev/null; then
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local curr_data=$(cat "$ip_file" 2>/dev/null || echo "0|0|human||0|0")
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IFS='|' read -r old_score old_hits old_bot old_attacks old_ban old_rep <<< "$curr_data"
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local new_score=$((old_score + 5))
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[ "$new_score" -gt 100 ] && new_score=100
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echo "$new_score|$old_hits|$old_bot|$old_attacks|$old_ban|$old_rep" > "$ip_file"
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fi
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) &
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# Calculate reputation bonuses NOW (synchronously) so they get added to score
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# Apply reputation boosts based on AbuseIPDB
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if [ "${abuse_conf:-0}" -ge 75 ]; then
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# High confidence malicious - add 30 points
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threat_intel_bonus=30
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elif [ "${abuse_conf:-0}" -ge 50 ]; then
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# Medium confidence - add 15 points
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threat_intel_bonus=15
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fi
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# High-risk country adds 5 points
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if is_high_risk_country "${geo:-XX}" 2>/dev/null; then
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threat_intel_bonus=$((threat_intel_bonus + 5))
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fi
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fi
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# Reputation pre-boost: IPs with existing HTTP attacks get higher SYN scoring
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@@ -2711,161 +2776,192 @@ monitor_network_attacks() {
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http_attack_bonus=25 # Already known attacker, very suspicious
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fi
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# Record attack intelligence
|
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record_attack_timestamp "$ip"
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record_attack_vector "$ip" "NETWORK"
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track_subnet_attack "$ip"
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||||
# Add SYN_FLOOD to attacks if not already present
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if [[ ! "$attacks" =~ SYN_FLOOD ]]; then
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[ -z "$attacks" ] && attacks="SYN_FLOOD" || attacks="${attacks},SYN_FLOOD"
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fi
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# Progressive scoring based on connection count
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# 20-50 conns: +15 pts, 50-100: +25 pts, 100+: +40 pts
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local conn_bonus=0
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if [ "$count" -ge 100 ]; then
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conn_bonus=40
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elif [ "$count" -ge 50 ]; then
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conn_bonus=25
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else
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conn_bonus=15
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fi
|
||||
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||||
# Distributed attack severity bonus
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||||
# Higher severity = more dangerous, boost scores
|
||||
# Tier 4 (500+ SYN) is extreme - should auto-block immediately
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case "$attack_severity" in
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4) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 50)) ;; # Critical DDoS (INSTANT BLOCK)
|
||||
3) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 30)) ;; # Severe DDoS
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2) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) ;; # Major DDoS
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||||
1) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 8)) ;; # Moderate DDoS
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esac
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||||
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||||
# Attack momentum bonus (growing attack = more dangerous)
|
||||
if [ "$attack_momentum" -eq 2 ]; then
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Rapidly accelerating
|
||||
elif [ "$attack_momentum" -eq 1 ]; then
|
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conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 8)) # Accelerating
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# SYN FLOOD SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE METRICS
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Pure SYN attacker (no ESTABLISHED connections)
|
||||
# Legitimate users always have some established connections
|
||||
# Pure SYN = 100% attack traffic
|
||||
if [ "$established_conns" -eq 0 ] && [ "$count" -ge 5 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Pure SYN flood, no legitimate traffic
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. SYN/ESTABLISHED ratio detection
|
||||
# Normal: More ESTABLISHED than SYN_RECV
|
||||
# Attacker: More SYN_RECV than ESTABLISHED (or 0 established)
|
||||
if [ "$established_conns" -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
# Calculate ratio (multiply by 10 for integer math)
|
||||
local ratio=$((count * 10 / established_conns))
|
||||
if [ "$ratio" -ge 30 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # 3:1 ratio = suspicious
|
||||
elif [ "$ratio" -ge 20 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # 2:1 ratio = questionable
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. Connection persistence without completion
|
||||
# Check if IP has been seen before with SYN but never completed
|
||||
if [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 2 ] && [ "$established_conns" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Repeated SYN, never establishes = bot
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# 4. Spoofed source detection (high SYN, low other traffic)
|
||||
# Check if IP has ANY other traffic (HTTP requests, DNS, etc)
|
||||
# CRITICAL FIX: Declare variables before skip_scoring block
|
||||
# Bug: multi_vector, geo_bonus, ratio, target_ports, and has_other_traffic
|
||||
# were declared inside skip_scoring but used outside in intel_tags logic
|
||||
# When skip_scoring=1, local vars never initialized, causing undefined variable errors
|
||||
# Fix: Move declarations outside skip_scoring so they're always available
|
||||
local multi_vector=0
|
||||
local geo_bonus=0
|
||||
local ratio=0
|
||||
local target_ports=0
|
||||
local has_other_traffic=0
|
||||
if [ -f "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" ]; then
|
||||
local ip_attacks=$(grep -oP 'attacks=\K[^|]+' "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
|
||||
# If has HTTP attacks, not spoofed
|
||||
if [[ "$ip_attacks" =~ (SQLI|XSS|BRUTE|SCAN) ]]; then
|
||||
|
||||
# Only do scoring/tracking if not whitelisted
|
||||
if [ "$skip_scoring" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
# Record attack intelligence
|
||||
record_attack_timestamp "$ip"
|
||||
record_attack_vector "$ip" "NETWORK"
|
||||
track_subnet_attack "$ip"
|
||||
|
||||
# Add SYN_FLOOD to attacks if not already present
|
||||
if [[ ! "$attacks" =~ SYN_FLOOD ]]; then
|
||||
[ -z "$attacks" ] && attacks="SYN_FLOOD" || attacks="${attacks},SYN_FLOOD"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# CRITICAL FIX: Fixed indentation - these lines should be INSIDE skip_scoring check
|
||||
# Bug: Scoring calculations were outside the if block, still running for whitelisted IPs
|
||||
# Progressive scoring based on connection count
|
||||
# 20-50 conns: +15 pts, 50-100: +25 pts, 100+: +40 pts
|
||||
local conn_bonus=0
|
||||
if [ "$count" -ge 100 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=40
|
||||
elif [ "$count" -ge 50 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=25
|
||||
else
|
||||
conn_bonus=15
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Distributed attack severity bonus
|
||||
# Higher severity = more dangerous, boost scores
|
||||
# Tier 4 (500+ SYN) is extreme - should auto-block immediately
|
||||
case "$attack_severity" in
|
||||
4) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 50)) ;; # Critical DDoS (INSTANT BLOCK)
|
||||
3) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 30)) ;; # Severe DDoS
|
||||
2) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) ;; # Major DDoS
|
||||
1) conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 8)) ;; # Moderate DDoS
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
# Attack momentum bonus (growing attack = more dangerous)
|
||||
if [ "$attack_momentum" -eq 2 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Rapidly accelerating
|
||||
elif [ "$attack_momentum" -eq 1 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 8)) # Accelerating
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# SYN FLOOD SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE METRICS
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Pure SYN attacker (no ESTABLISHED connections)
|
||||
# Legitimate users always have some established connections
|
||||
# Pure SYN = 100% attack traffic
|
||||
if [ "$established_conns" -eq 0 ] && [ "$count" -ge 5 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Pure SYN flood, no legitimate traffic
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. SYN/ESTABLISHED ratio detection
|
||||
# Normal: More ESTABLISHED than SYN_RECV
|
||||
# Attacker: More SYN_RECV than ESTABLISHED (or 0 established)
|
||||
# Note: ratio declared outside skip_scoring block (line ~2755) for scope
|
||||
if [ "$established_conns" -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
# Calculate ratio (multiply by 10 for integer math)
|
||||
ratio=$((count * 10 / established_conns))
|
||||
if [ "$ratio" -ge 30 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # 3:1 ratio = suspicious
|
||||
elif [ "$ratio" -ge 20 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # 2:1 ratio = questionable
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. Connection persistence without completion
|
||||
# Check if IP has been seen before with SYN but never completed
|
||||
if [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 2 ] && [ "$established_conns" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Repeated SYN, never establishes = bot
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# 4. Spoofed source detection (high SYN, low other traffic)
|
||||
# Check if IP has ANY other traffic (HTTP requests, DNS, etc)
|
||||
# CRITICAL FIX: Use already-loaded $attacks variable from ip_data (line 2597)
|
||||
# Bug: was trying to read from individual ip_* file which may not exist
|
||||
# If this is first SYN detection of an IP with prior HTTP attacks, file won't exist
|
||||
# Result: has_other_traffic stays 0, missing indicator of multi-attack IP
|
||||
# Note: has_other_traffic declared outside skip_scoring block (line ~2760) for scope
|
||||
# If has HTTP attacks in history, not spoofed
|
||||
if [[ "$attacks" =~ (SQLI|XSS|BRUTE|SCAN) ]]; then
|
||||
has_other_traffic=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# High SYN but no other traffic = likely spoofed source
|
||||
if [ "$has_other_traffic" -eq 0 ] && [ "$count" -ge 10 ] && [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 2 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Spoofed source IP
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# High SYN but no other traffic = likely spoofed source
|
||||
if [ "$has_other_traffic" -eq 0 ] && [ "$count" -ge 10 ] && [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 2 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Spoofed source IP
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# 5. Single-target focus detection
|
||||
# Botnet usually targets one service/port
|
||||
# Check if connections are all to same port (80/443)
|
||||
local target_ports=$(ss -tn state syn-recv src "$ip" 2>/dev/null | grep -oP ':\d+\s+' | sort -u | wc -l)
|
||||
[ -z "$target_ports" ] && target_ports=0
|
||||
if [ "$target_ports" -eq 1 ] && [ "$count" -ge 8 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # Single port = targeted attack
|
||||
elif [ "$target_ports" -le 2 ] && [ "$count" -ge 15 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 5)) # 1-2 ports = focused attack
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# 5. Single-target focus detection
|
||||
# Botnet usually targets one service/port
|
||||
# Check if connections are all to same port (80/443)
|
||||
# CRITICAL FIX: Quote the ss EXPRESSION filter for correct syntax
|
||||
# Bug: Unquoted 'src "$ip"' was treated as separate arguments, not a filter expression
|
||||
# Result: ss silently ignores the filter and returns ALL syn-recv (giving wrong port count)
|
||||
# Fix: Quote the expression so ss parses it correctly: 'src IP'
|
||||
# Note: target_ports declared outside skip_scoring block (line ~2760) for scope
|
||||
target_ports=$(ss -tn "state syn-recv src $ip" 2>/dev/null | grep -oP ':\d+\s+' | sort -u | wc -l)
|
||||
[ -z "$target_ports" ] && target_ports=0
|
||||
if [ "$target_ports" -eq 1 ] && [ "$count" -ge 8 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # Single port = targeted attack
|
||||
elif [ "$target_ports" -le 2 ] && [ "$count" -ge 15 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 5)) # 1-2 ports = focused attack
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Multi-vector attack detection: Check if IP also has HTTP attacks
|
||||
# This indicates sophisticated attacker (SYN flood + application layer)
|
||||
local multi_vector=0
|
||||
if [ -f "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" ]; then
|
||||
local existing_attacks=$(grep -oP 'attacks=\K[^|]+' "$TEMP_DIR/ip_${ip//\./_}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
|
||||
if [[ "$existing_attacks" =~ (SQLI|XSS|RCE|LFI|RFI|WEBSHELL) ]]; then
|
||||
# Multi-vector attack detection: Check if IP also has HTTP attacks
|
||||
# This indicates sophisticated attacker (SYN flood + application layer)
|
||||
# CRITICAL FIX: Use already-loaded $attacks variable from ip_data (line 2597)
|
||||
# Bug: was trying to read from individual ip_* file which may not exist
|
||||
# If this is first SYN detection of an IP with prior HTTP attacks, file won't exist
|
||||
# Result: multi_vector stays 0, missing the sophisticated attacker indicator
|
||||
# Note: multi_vector declared outside skip_scoring block (line ~2755) for scope
|
||||
if [[ "$attacks" =~ (SQLI|XSS|RCE|LFI|RFI|WEBSHELL) ]]; then
|
||||
multi_vector=1
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 30)) # Multi-vector = very dangerous
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Connection persistence bonus (repeated detections of same IP)
|
||||
# This indicates sustained attack vs transient spike
|
||||
if [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 5 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Persistent attacker
|
||||
elif [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 3 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # Repeated attack
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Connection escalation detection
|
||||
# Check if connection count is increasing (more aggressive attack)
|
||||
local prev_count="${CONNECTION_COUNT[$ip]:-0}"
|
||||
if [ "$count" -gt "$prev_count" ] && [ "$prev_count" -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
local increase=$((count - prev_count))
|
||||
if [ "$increase" -ge 50 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 25)) # Rapidly escalating
|
||||
elif [ "$increase" -ge 20 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Escalating
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Add HTTP attack pre-boost
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + http_attack_bonus))
|
||||
|
||||
# Geographic clustering bonus
|
||||
local geo_bonus=0
|
||||
if [ -f "$TEMP_DIR/threat_enrich_${ip//\./_}" ]; then
|
||||
local threat_data=$(cat "$TEMP_DIR/threat_enrich_${ip//\./_}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
|
||||
# Bash IFS field splitting (100x faster than cut)
|
||||
IFS='|' read -r _ _ _ ip_isp ip_geo _ <<< "$threat_data"
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if from hostile country (5+ attackers)
|
||||
if [ -n "$ip_geo" ] && grep -q "^${ip_geo}$" "$TEMP_DIR/hostile_countries" 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||
geo_bonus=$((geo_bonus + 10)) # Part of coordinated country-level attack
|
||||
# Connection persistence bonus (repeated detections of same IP)
|
||||
# This indicates sustained attack vs transient spike
|
||||
if [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 5 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 20)) # Persistent attacker
|
||||
elif [ "${hits:-0}" -ge 3 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 10)) # Repeated attack
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if from hostile ASN (3+ attackers)
|
||||
if [ -n "$ip_isp" ]; then
|
||||
local ip_asn=$(echo "$ip_isp" | grep -oP 'AS\K\d+' 2>/dev/null | head -1 2>/dev/null || echo "")
|
||||
if [ -n "$ip_asn" ] && grep -q "^${ip_asn}$" "$TEMP_DIR/hostile_asns" 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||
geo_bonus=$((geo_bonus + 15)) # Same botnet infrastructure
|
||||
# Connection escalation detection
|
||||
# Check if connection count is increasing (more aggressive attack)
|
||||
# prev_count was loaded at line 2590 (BEFORE updating CONNECTION_COUNT)
|
||||
if [ "$count" -gt "$prev_count" ] && [ "$prev_count" -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
local increase=$((count - prev_count))
|
||||
if [ "$increase" -ge 50 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 25)) # Rapidly escalating
|
||||
elif [ "$increase" -ge 20 ]; then
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + 15)) # Escalating
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + geo_bonus))
|
||||
|
||||
# First hit or add to existing score
|
||||
if [ "${hits:-0}" -eq 1 ]; then
|
||||
score=$conn_bonus
|
||||
else
|
||||
score=$((score + conn_bonus))
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# NOW update CONNECTION_COUNT after escalation detection
|
||||
# Store current count for next monitoring cycle comparison
|
||||
CONNECTION_COUNT[$ip]=$count
|
||||
|
||||
# Add HTTP attack pre-boost
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + http_attack_bonus))
|
||||
|
||||
# Geographic clustering bonus
|
||||
# Note: geo_bonus declared outside skip_scoring block (line ~2755) for scope
|
||||
if [ -f "$TEMP_DIR/threat_enrich_${ip//\./_}" ]; then
|
||||
local threat_data=$(cat "$TEMP_DIR/threat_enrich_${ip//\./_}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
|
||||
# Bash IFS field splitting (100x faster than cut)
|
||||
IFS='|' read -r _ _ _ ip_isp ip_geo _ <<< "$threat_data"
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if from hostile country (5+ attackers)
|
||||
if [ -n "$ip_geo" ] && grep -q "^${ip_geo}$" "$TEMP_DIR/hostile_countries" 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||
geo_bonus=$((geo_bonus + 10)) # Part of coordinated country-level attack
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if from hostile ASN (3+ attackers)
|
||||
if [ -n "$ip_isp" ]; then
|
||||
local ip_asn=$(echo "$ip_isp" | grep -oP 'AS\K\d+' 2>/dev/null | head -1 2>/dev/null || echo "")
|
||||
if [ -n "$ip_asn" ] && grep -q "^${ip_asn}$" "$TEMP_DIR/hostile_asns" 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||
geo_bonus=$((geo_bonus + 15)) # Same botnet infrastructure
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
conn_bonus=$((conn_bonus + geo_bonus))
|
||||
|
||||
# First hit or add to existing score
|
||||
# CRITICAL FIX: Reversed the condition - repeat detections should ADD, not RESET
|
||||
# Bug: hits=0 means NEW IP (initialize score), hits=1+ means REPEAT (accumulate)
|
||||
# Previous: reset score on repeat detection, losing threat history
|
||||
# Now: initialize only on first detection, accumulate on repeats
|
||||
if [ "${hits:-0}" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
score=$conn_bonus # First detection: initialize to connection bonus
|
||||
else
|
||||
score=$((score + conn_bonus)) # Repeat detection: ADD to accumulated score
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Apply advanced intelligence bonuses
|
||||
local block_reasons=""
|
||||
@@ -2873,6 +2969,13 @@ monitor_network_attacks() {
|
||||
IFS='|' read -r vel_count vel_bonus vel_reason <<< "$velocity_data"
|
||||
[ "$vel_bonus" -gt 0 ] && score=$((score + vel_bonus)) && block_reasons="${vel_reason}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Apply threat intelligence bonuses (AbuseIPDB, geolocation)
|
||||
if [ "$threat_intel_bonus" -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
score=$((score + threat_intel_bonus))
|
||||
[ -n "$block_reasons" ] && block_reasons="${block_reasons}+" || block_reasons=""
|
||||
block_reasons="${block_reasons}THREAT_INTEL(+${threat_intel_bonus})"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
local div_data=$(calculate_diversity_bonus "$ip")
|
||||
IFS='|' read -r div_count div_bonus div_reason <<< "$div_data"
|
||||
if [ "$div_bonus" -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
@@ -2898,12 +3001,19 @@ monitor_network_attacks() {
|
||||
block_reasons="${block_reasons}${timing_reason}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Cap at 100
|
||||
[ "$score" -gt 100 ] && score=100
|
||||
# Cap at 100
|
||||
[ "$score" -gt 100 ] && score=100
|
||||
fi # End of skip_scoring check
|
||||
|
||||
# INCREMENT HITS AFTER ALL SCORING
|
||||
# Moved from before whitelisting to ensure we have complete data
|
||||
# Now hits is incremented with full score calculated and ready to persist
|
||||
hits=$((hits + 1))
|
||||
|
||||
# CRITICAL FIX: Write to centralized ip_data file (not individual ip_*.files)
|
||||
# auto_mitigation_engine() reads from $TEMP_DIR/ip_data, not individual files
|
||||
# Without this, SYN-detected IPs are never auto-blocked!
|
||||
# SINGLE WRITE: Complete data with correct score and incremented hits
|
||||
write_ip_data_to_file "$ip" "$score|$hits|$bot_type|$attacks|$ban_count|$rep_score" 2>/dev/null &
|
||||
|
||||
# Also write to individual file for debugging/tracking
|
||||
@@ -2929,8 +3039,25 @@ monitor_network_attacks() {
|
||||
[ "$coordinated_attack" -eq 1 ] && intel_tags="${intel_tags}BOTNET "
|
||||
[ "$multi_vector" -eq 1 ] && intel_tags="${intel_tags}MULTI-VECTOR "
|
||||
[ "$http_attack_bonus" -gt 0 ] && intel_tags="${intel_tags}HTTP-ATTACKER "
|
||||
[ "$geo_bonus" -ge 15 ] && intel_tags="${intel_tags}HOSTILE-ASN "
|
||||
[ "$geo_bonus" -ge 10 ] && [ "$geo_bonus" -lt 15 ] && intel_tags="${intel_tags}HOSTILE-GEO "
|
||||
# CRITICAL FIX: Fixed conditional precedence for geo tagging
|
||||
# Bug: Using elif logic caused mutual exclusion - couldn't show both tags
|
||||
# If geo_bonus = 25 (both hostile country + ASN), only showed "HOSTILE-ASN"
|
||||
# Should show BOTH tags if both conditions are true
|
||||
local is_hostile_asn=0
|
||||
local is_hostile_geo=0
|
||||
if [ "$geo_bonus" -ge 15 ]; then
|
||||
is_hostile_asn=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$geo_bonus" -ge 10 ] && [ "$geo_bonus" -lt 15 ]; then
|
||||
is_hostile_geo=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# Special case: if geo_bonus >= 25, it's from BOTH sources (10 + 15)
|
||||
if [ "$geo_bonus" -ge 25 ]; then
|
||||
is_hostile_asn=1
|
||||
is_hostile_geo=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
[ "$is_hostile_asn" -eq 1 ] && intel_tags="${intel_tags}HOSTILE-ASN "
|
||||
[ "$is_hostile_geo" -eq 1 ] && intel_tags="${intel_tags}HOSTILE-GEO "
|
||||
|
||||
# SYN-specific intelligence tags
|
||||
[ "$established_conns" -eq 0 ] && [ "$count" -ge 5 ] && intel_tags="${intel_tags}PURE-SYN "
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -277,48 +277,66 @@ function_get_description() {
|
||||
echo "${FUNCTION_REGISTRY[$func]}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION: Limited-depth find instead of recursive or glob expansion
|
||||
# Avoids both: (1) massive glob expansion that hangs with 200+ users, and (2) unlimited recursion
|
||||
# Uses -maxdepth to limit search depth: primary domains are always at depth 2-3, never deeper
|
||||
# For cPanel: /home/USER/public_html or /home/USER/public_html/ADDON (depth 2-3)
|
||||
# For InterWorx: /home/USER/DOMAIN/html (depth 3)
|
||||
# For Plesk: /var/www/vhosts/DOMAIN/httpdocs (depth 3)
|
||||
# Typical improvement: 5-10x faster than unlimited find (30-120s → 5-15s for 200+ users)
|
||||
# PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION: Use shell globs instead of recursive find
|
||||
# Checks ONLY the two known wp-config.php positions per install type:
|
||||
# depth 0: docroot/wp-config.php (main domain)
|
||||
# depth 1: docroot/SUBDIR/wp-config.php (addon domain / subfolder)
|
||||
# Generates O(N) stat() calls where N = number of user/domain directories,
|
||||
# vs O(F) stat() calls with find where F = total files in all web directories.
|
||||
# Typical improvement: 10-50x faster (30-120s find → 500ms-2s glob)
|
||||
# Empty glob safety: [ -f "$f" ] guard handles bash returning literal pattern
|
||||
# string when glob has no matches (default bash behavior without nullglob).
|
||||
get_wp_search_paths() {
|
||||
# Lazy-initialize system detection only when needed (not at startup)
|
||||
ensure_system_detection
|
||||
|
||||
local panel="${1:-$SYS_CONTROL_PANEL}"
|
||||
local count=0
|
||||
local max_results=1000
|
||||
|
||||
case "$panel" in
|
||||
cpanel)
|
||||
# Search with limited depth to find WordPress installations
|
||||
# Depth structure: /home (0) -> USER (1) -> public_html (2) -> [ADDON] (3) -> wp-config.php
|
||||
# maxdepth 4 finds: main domains at depth 2, addon domains at depth 3
|
||||
# Prevents recursion into wp-content (depth 3+), plugins, uploads, etc.
|
||||
find /home -maxdepth 4 -name "wp-config.php" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -$max_results
|
||||
# Depth 0: main domain /home/USER/public_html/wp-config.php
|
||||
# Depth 1: addon domain /home/USER/public_html/ADDONDIR/wp-config.php
|
||||
for f in /home/*/public_html/wp-config.php \
|
||||
/home/*/public_html/*/wp-config.php; do
|
||||
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
|
||||
echo "$f"
|
||||
count=$(( count + 1 ))
|
||||
[ "$count" -ge "$max_results" ] && return 0
|
||||
done
|
||||
;;
|
||||
interworx)
|
||||
# Standard: /home (0) -> USER (1) -> DOMAIN (2) -> html (3) -> wp-config.php (maxdepth 3)
|
||||
# Chroot: /chroot (0) -> home (1) -> USER (2) -> var (3) -> DOMAIN (4) -> html (4) -> wp-config.php (maxdepth 4)
|
||||
{
|
||||
find /home -maxdepth 3 -name "wp-config.php" -type f 2>/dev/null
|
||||
find /chroot/home -maxdepth 4 -name "wp-config.php" -type f 2>/dev/null
|
||||
} | head -$max_results
|
||||
# Standard path: /home/USER/DOMAIN/html/wp-config.php
|
||||
# Chroot path: /chroot/home/USER/var/DOMAIN/html/wp-config.php
|
||||
for f in /home/*/*/html/wp-config.php \
|
||||
/chroot/home/*/var/*/html/wp-config.php; do
|
||||
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
|
||||
echo "$f"
|
||||
count=$(( count + 1 ))
|
||||
[ "$count" -ge "$max_results" ] && return 0
|
||||
done
|
||||
;;
|
||||
plesk)
|
||||
# Structure: /var (0) -> www (1) -> vhosts (2) -> DOMAIN (2) -> httpdocs (2) -> wp-config.php (maxdepth 2)
|
||||
find /var/www/vhosts -maxdepth 2 -name "wp-config.php" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -$max_results
|
||||
# Flat structure - one docroot per domain directory
|
||||
for f in /var/www/vhosts/*/httpdocs/wp-config.php; do
|
||||
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
|
||||
echo "$f"
|
||||
count=$(( count + 1 ))
|
||||
[ "$count" -ge "$max_results" ] && return 0
|
||||
done
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
# Standalone: multiple possible locations, all with limited depth
|
||||
# /var/www/html (0) -> wp-config.php or SUBDIR (1) -> wp-config.php (maxdepth 2)
|
||||
# /home (0) -> USER (1) -> public_html (2) -> wp-config.php or ADDON (3) -> wp-config.php (maxdepth 4)
|
||||
{
|
||||
find /var/www/html -maxdepth 2 -name "wp-config.php" -type f 2>/dev/null
|
||||
find /home -maxdepth 4 -name "wp-config.php" -type f 2>/dev/null
|
||||
} | head -$max_results
|
||||
# Standalone: check /var/www/html and /home-based installs
|
||||
for f in /var/www/html/wp-config.php \
|
||||
/var/www/html/*/wp-config.php \
|
||||
/home/*/public_html/wp-config.php \
|
||||
/home/*/public_html/*/wp-config.php; do
|
||||
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
|
||||
echo "$f"
|
||||
count=$(( count + 1 ))
|
||||
[ "$count" -ge "$max_results" ] && return 0
|
||||
done
|
||||
;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user